::[INCOMING TRANSMISSION]::
SOURCE: New Berlin
ENCRYPTION:RS-XD-9301
REPUBLICAN SHIPPING SIGNAL IDENTIFIED......
ID:NIKLAS MAYER LOCATION:Duisburg SUBJECT:Altona Station: Damage Report Guten Tag
As you may have heard, Altona Station was attacked and heavily damaged. Currently we are waiting for Rheinland Military/Rheinland Federal Police to conduct their investigation.
Once they have completed, I would like Daumann Heavy Construction to conduct a damage report. To indicate the extent of the damage, what will be required for repairs, and an estimate of how long reconstruction will take.
Please find attached a catalogue that can be used.
『Source: Vincent Stiglitz | Daumann Heavy Construction
『Relay: New Berlin, Main Relay
『Encryption: AgeiraSec II
『Access: Republican,DHC
Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,
Our apologies for the late reply! We can send a team out to investigate as soon as the RFP finish their investigation, from our teams reports we can provide estimates on both time and cost for the repairs. We will dispatch the team free of charge due to the good relationships that our companies share. If any more information is needed from us do not hesitate to respond. Also, please let us know when the RFP have finished their investigations.
Mit freundlichen Grüßen.
『Vincent Stiglitz
『Vincent Stiglitz
『Daumann Heavy Construction
『Vorstandsmitglied
DHC-Kiel (Vincent Stiglitz - Daumann Heavy Construction) DHC-Hammelburg (Vincent Stiglitz - Daumann Heavy Construction)[ [RM]Fl.Hugo.Oppenheimer (Hugo Oppenheimer - Rhineland Military) RNC-Essen (Rhineland Military Reserve) Russian_Weapons_Dealer (Freelance Weapon Smuggler)
『Source: < Erwin Mannlicher | Daumann Heavy Construction >
『Relay: New Berlin, Main Relay
『Encryption: AgeiraSec II
『Access: RS Executive Board | DHC Executive Board
Niklas, Sehr geehrte mitglieder des RS Vorstands,
I am pleased to be able to present to you the final report on the Altona investigation. Please find it below. Danke.
Jansen: Right... mission log zero-zero-two. We're about to breach the secondary door
before we proceed into Section...looks like its going to be... Sectior 7-Alpha, and we
can get into.. yes, that will do it.
Erik: Jansen, Erik here. My team is through the bulkhead but ~static~ there's ~static~ no chance of getting through ~static~, not with the coils still charg- ~static~ We did it Jansen! We got in through the hangar bay, just like you set ~static~ and we just cut the beam away and ~static~
Jansen: VERDAMNT! HEINRICH, Can. You. Hear. Me?
Erik: Ja, Jansen ~static~ Bulkhead shifted ~static~ Entire section gave away.
We've ~static~ should ~static~
I hope it works.
:::End Recording: Mission Log-002 :::
Introduction:
An die zustaendigen Person(en):
In accordance with the intial contract issued to Daumann Heavy Construction on behalf of Republican Shipping and the Bundespolizei, a standard format 3 stage review of the facility "Altona Station" was conducted by a total of twelve (12) teams of Daumann qualified Inspection & Recovery Teams. The initial phase of the review provided some major obstacles: notably, due to the total failure of electric systems, access to the station was achieved only by manual breaching means. Furthermore, the unexpected - but concentrated - impact on the strctural support of the station's frame in the area of the Oder-Gunboat Impact caused set backs as emergency measures were put in place.
On completion of the full process of the evidenciary review we can establish that although appearing significant, the actual damage to Altona Station is well within recoverable means. Overall, the damage consists of of seven (7) Damage Factors, categorizable in 3 main categories. It is particularly positive that our teams were able to completely and fully repressurize the station using emergency systems.
It is our projection and conclusion that the damage reviewed at the Orbital Facility "Altona Station" can be categorized as "Raparable - Mid-H Difficulty in Repairs". With the proper materials and staff, repair and reconstruction of the facility to a safe and staffable level could be achieved within three (3) months or less.
Damage Report:
||
Extensive and prolonged inspection and review of the condition, internal and external, of subject "Altona Station (RS)" by the Daumann Inspections Teams have compiled a comprehensive list of all damage throughout the client facility. These are catalogued below with appropriate steps to remedy each risk indicator.
Despite some small initial difficulties experienced by Inspection Team #119, which initiated its First Observational Sweep in support of the then on-going RFP investigation into the Altona Terrorist attack, they were eventually able to pressurize and safely access Zone #7 around the primary impact point. After this intial setback, the investigation proceeded relatively smoothly - slowed primarily by the frequent necessity for recovery and inspections teams to cut their way through damaged bulkheads to access relevant areas, as a result of all electronic systems remaining offline.
This report represents the formal conclusion of the "Client File: Altona Station (RS) Investigation" inspection. In all, our teams have identified seven (7) primary areas of damage. This report catagorizes them according to severity and priority in recoverying the asset; wherin "High Impact" are major areas of risk, concern or damage, "Mid Impact" is areas of important damage with no major risk, and "Low Impact" is areas of minor damage, routine issues and summary problems.
- High Impact -
"All entries in this category should be considered a priority, resulting from any of the following: high risk of further damage or collapse, particularly high impact damage, or entries representing the most significant proportion of damage examined during the course of the Client Inspection.
► Factor #1 - NEMP Impact Point
As intended in the original client brief, the primary point of inspection was started in the vicinity of the Primary Impact Point of the NEMP Warhead.
During the course of the external inspection of the station, it became apparent that the warhead detonated in close proximity of the station's outer hull plating, rather than directly upon impact. While this appears to have increased the electromagnetic effects, is reduced the gravitic impact upon the structure of the hull. The damage in this area consists primarily of one (1) breach, as well as one (1) case of buckling hull plates at a secondary impact point; determined to be a riccocheting element of the discharged warhead.
Despite the damage to the hull segments in this quarter, the structural integrity of this area of the station remains intact. Despite initial difficulties in accessing the area, with the help of heavier cutting machinery the Inspection teams were able to cut the wreckage free and eventually able to repressurize the area in a temporary fashion.
In all, damage to this Inspection Factor significant and thus rated "High Impact", however our teams rate the repairs as "Reparable - Mid (U)". The damage comprises, and will require replacement and repair of:
127 Destroyed or Damaged Hull Segments
300 Replacement Panels, Supports, Beams, etc.
► Factor #2 - Vessel Crash Impact Point
As outlined in the original Polizei Report, during the course of the original Incident, a gunboat class vessel operated by Republican Shipping - at the time engaged in evacuation attempts - impacted the station as a result of electromagnetic fallout following the NEMP detonation. Our initial inspection was able to confirm EMP-triggered system failure as the cause of the crash. We were able to retreive the Black Box, though much of the data has been corrupted - data included in burst format in this Report.
Contrary to initial expections, this Factor (henceforth "IP:Od"), proved to be the area in which the most significant damage to the station was cataloged. The vessel's impact point, nine (9) meters above the Structural Framework Reference #X1-09 of the Superstructure, caused fusing of the hull to the super structure. Initial access to the area was achieved with minor effort, however recovery and inspection was delayed and complicated my several significant shifts in the structural safety of the compartment.
In all, damage to this Inspection Factor is significant and high risk, and thus rated "High Impact", our teams rate the repairs as "Reparable - High (V-U)". We advise this Factor be considered the primary point of focus for repairs going forward. Although, after more than two weeks of heavy operations, our Inspection and Recovery teams were able to stabilze and brace the structural integrity of the station, repair of the Structural Framework must proceed before other necessary repairs. The damage comprises and will require replacement and repair of:
2 Structural Beams
3 Structural Braces
401 Destroyed or Damaged Hull Segments
800 Replacement Parts, Panels, etc
- Mid Impact -
All entries in this category should be considered of middling priority, resulting from any of the following: there is no risk of further damage or collapse, damage is significant but reparable without difficulty, or entries representing necessary repairs. Mid Impact Factors often form the bulk of repairs, but pose no significant hinderance to other works if uncompleted.
► Factor #3 - Electromagnetic Pulse Damage
In all known cases of NEMP warhead detonations, one of the primary impact factors is derived from the extremely high electromagnetic discharge of these devices. Unsurprisingly, the same factors are present in the Altona investigation. Although by the time of the main inspection the station and its electrical subsystems have had sufficient time to bleed all positive charge. While rendered relatively safe, this means every powered sub-system, including Generators must be manually restarted once all repairs are undertaken. Despite the Safe-Bleed and Discharge Systems working, broadly, as intended, there remains significant systemic repairs. The damage comprises, and will require replacement and repair of:
910 meters of cabling, metallic
137 meters of cabling, optronic
200 assorted electronic systems, plugs, etc
► Factor #4 - Secondary Damage
As a result of the major electromagnetic, electrostatic and physik discharges, added to the factor of explsive discharges centered around the IP:Od Factor, the Altona facility suffered a not insignificant amount of damage in the aftermath of the attack. As a result of secondary explosions and plasma fires which raged in the hours after the incident, there is notable damage - albeit relatively easily reparable - to a number of subsystems. The damage comprises, and will require replacement and repair of:
1209 meters assorted cabling, optronic and metallic
Additionally, Inspection of the Reactor Core Assemblies revealed further secondary damage. This was eventually concluded to have been caused primarily by massive discharges through the bleed-coils during the Eletromagnetic surge. The damage is largely superficial, but must be completed before the system and station can effectively be powered without reliance on external power sources such as those presently in use as a stopgap measure for our inspection. The damage includes and will require repair of:
Reactor C-2; minor fire damage to controls and heat shield.
Reactor C-5; 1/5 Reactor Discharge Coils Destroyed, cosmetic fire damage to primary bay panneling
► Factor #5 - Sabotage Damage
As pre-existing sabotage was indicated in the intial Polizei briefing, we deployed an Inspection team with the specific task of identifying and cataloguing all damage caused prior to the Altona Incident, with particular focus on any damage that is suspect and which indicates or links to pre-incident sabotage. In all, numerous cases were catalogues, however all examples identified were of minor significance - most fall in the category "Reparable - ® Routine Maintenance". In all, the damage comprises and will require repair of:
34 examples; Fuses rewired, missing or disabled
21 examples; Unauthorized Graffiti
12 examples; Door Mechanisms hacked, rewired or rendered inoperative.
9 examples; Emergency Alarms cut, panels disabled or otherwise destroyed
5 examples; Fire Suppression Equipment missing or disabled
2 examples; Disabled Security Devices
1 example; toilet facility blocked
► Factor #6 - Minor Cosmetic Damage
In all cases of significant damage to stations, facilities or other client property, there is an expectation to find significant amounts of minor comsetic damage, resulting from secondary oxygen fires, plasma fires, and any secondary damage factors. The Altona Station case is no different. Notably, there is substantial scorching through several areas of the ship, as well as graffiti predating the incident and cleaning of general debris.
► Factor #7 - Recovery Damage
In the case of Altona, as predicted in the initial Mission Briefing, due to the Electromagnetic effects on the station's electric systems and sub-systems, recovery and inspection teams were often required to make alternative access points and integrate ad-hoc power solutions into specific subsystems in order to proceed. As a result of this, the following damage was catalogued for repairs - all rated "Low Impact - Reparable ® Routine Repairs":
11 examples; Paint Application for Directional Signals
9 examples, Sub System Damage or Overload as result of external power source
Report Conclusions
It is our projection and conclusion that the damage reviewed at the Orbital Facility "Altona Station" can be categorized as "Raparable - Mid-H Difficulty in Repairs". With the proper materials and staff, repair and reconstruction of the facility to a safe and staffable level could be achieved within three (3) months or less.
In order to achieve this, a complement of 210 Daumann Engineers, Technicians, Staff and Specialists will be required, in addition to heavy construction equipment. Furthermore, shipment and provision of substantial quantities of replacement parts will be required. The Senior Inspection Agent of "Client File: Altona Station (RS)" compiled as a minimum requirement the provision to Altona of:
1000 Optical Chips
500 Optronic Arrays
2500 Optronics
2500 Plasfoam Conduits
2500 Hull Segments
5000 Industrial Hardware
5000 Industrial Materials
5000 Fusion Diodes
500 Robotic Hardware
10000 Reinforced Alloy
500 Hazmat Cannisters
Additional Notes
- No additional Notes - Looks like you got off pretty easy in the end Niklas. If your people can ship it, mine will fix it. We'll get that old tub up and running again before you know it. Mein wort! -Erwin.
Transmission Ends.
Danke for your time.
Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
『Erwin Mannlicher
『 E. Mannlicher
『Daumann Heavy Construction
『Betriebsleiter