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Extensive and prolonged inspection and review of the condition, internal and external, of subject "Altona Station (RS)" by the Daumann Inspections Teams have compiled a comprehensive list of all damage throughout the client facility. These are catalogued below with appropriate steps to remedy each risk indicator.

Despite some small initial difficulties experienced by Inspection Team #119, which initiated its First Observational Sweep in support of the then on-going RFP investigation into the Altona Terrorist attack, they were eventually able to pressurize and safely access Zone #7 around the primary impact point. After this intial setback, the investigation proceeded relatively smoothly - slowed primarily by the frequent necessity for recovery and inspections teams to cut their way through damaged bulkheads to access relevant areas, as a result of all electronic systems remaining offline.

This report represents the formal conclusion of the "Client File: Altona Station (RS) Investigation" inspection. In all, our teams have identified seven (7) primary areas of damage. This report catagorizes them according to severity and priority in recoverying the asset; wherin "High Impact" are major areas of risk, concern or damage, "Mid Impact" is areas of important damage with no major risk, and "Low Impact" is areas of minor damage, routine issues and summary problems.

"All entries in this category should be considered a priority, resulting from any of the following: high risk of further damage or collapse, particularly high impact damage, or entries representing the most significant proportion of damage examined during the course of the Client Inspection.

All entries in this category should be considered of middling priority, resulting from any of the following: there is no risk of further damage or collapse, damage is significant but reparable without difficulty, or entries representing necessary repairs. Mid Impact Factors often form the bulk of repairs, but pose no significant hinderance to other works if uncompleted.

► Factor #3 - Electromagnetic Pulse Damage
In all known cases of NEMP warhead detonations, one of the primary impact factors is derived from the extremely high electromagnetic discharge of these devices. Unsurprisingly, the same factors are present in the Altona investigation. Although by the time of the main inspection the station and its electrical subsystems have had sufficient time to bleed all positive charge. While rendered relatively safe, this means every powered sub-system, including Generators must be manually restarted once all repairs are undertaken. Despite the Safe-Bleed and Discharge Systems working, broadly, as intended, there remains significant systemic repairs. The damage comprises, and will require replacement and repair of:

• 910 meters of cabling, metallic
  
• 137 meters of cabling, optronic
  
• 200 assorted electronic systems, plugs, etc

► Factor #4 - Secondary Damage
As a result of the major electromagnetic, electrostatic and physik discharges, added to the factor of explsive discharges centered around the IP:Od Factor, the Altona facility suffered a not insignificant amount of damage in the aftermath of the attack. As a result of secondary explosions and plasma fires which raged in the hours after the incident, there is notable damage - albeit relatively easily reparable - to a number of subsystems. The damage comprises, and will require replacement and repair of:

• 3 destroyed EPS Conduits
  
• 371 RydC-01 Interchange Converter Relays
  
• 219 LRM-300 Intermittent Relay Breakers
  
• 1952 Standard Exchange Plugs
  
• 19 DHC-Serie-M-800 (ausf. B/RS), Primary Relay Coils
  
• 1209 meters assorted cabling, optronic and metallic
  

Additionally, Inspection of the Reactor Core Assemblies revealed further secondary damage. This was eventually concluded to have been caused primarily by massive discharges through the bleed-coils during the Eletromagnetic surge. The damage is largely superficial, but must be completed before the system and station can effectively be powered without reliance on external power sources such as those presently in use as a stopgap measure for our inspection. The damage includes and will require repair of:

• Reactor C-2; minor fire damage to controls and heat shield.
  
• Reactor C-5; 1/5 Reactor Discharge Coils Destroyed, cosmetic fire damage to primary bay panneling
  
• Main Reactor; 1 Discharge Coil Destroyed, 1 Discharge Coil damaged (reparable on-site)

► Factor #5 - Sabotage Damage
As pre-existing sabotage was indicated in the intial Polizei briefing, we deployed an Inspection team with the specific task of identifying and cataloguing all damage caused prior to the Altona Incident, with particular focus on any damage that is suspect and which indicates or links to pre-incident sabotage. In all, numerous cases were catalogues, however all examples identified were of minor significance - most fall in the category "Reparable - ® Routine Maintenance". In all, the damage comprises and will require repair of:

• 34 examples; Fuses rewired, missing or disabled
  
• 21 examples; Unauthorized Graffiti
  
• 12 examples; Door Mechanisms hacked, rewired or rendered inoperative.
  
• 9 examples; Emergency Alarms cut, panels disabled or otherwise destroyed
  
• 5 examples; Fire Suppression Equipment missing or disabled
  
• 2 examples; Disabled Security Devices
  
• 1 example; toilet facility blocked

► Factor #6 - Minor Cosmetic Damage
In all cases of significant damage to stations, facilities or other client property, there is an expectation to find significant amounts of minor comsetic damage, resulting from secondary oxygen fires, plasma fires, and any secondary damage factors. The Altona Station case is no different. Notably, there is substantial scorching through several areas of the ship, as well as graffiti predating the incident and cleaning of general debris.


► Factor #7 - Recovery Damage
In the case of Altona, as predicted in the initial Mission Briefing, due to the Electromagnetic effects on the station's electric systems and sub-systems, recovery and inspection teams were often required to make alternative access points and integrate ad-hoc power solutions into specific subsystems in order to proceed. As a result of this, the following damage was catalogued for repairs - all rated "Low Impact - Reparable ® Routine Repairs":

• 72 examples; Emergency Lighting manually battery-wired
  
• 53 examples; Bulkheads or Bulkhead Doors Breached
  
• 24 examples; Emergency Breach Seals
  
• 11 examples; Paint Application for Directional Signals
  
• 9 examples, Sub System Damage or Overload as result of external power source

It is our projection and conclusion that the damage reviewed at the Orbital Facility "Altona Station" can be categorized as "Raparable - Mid-H Difficulty in Repairs". With the proper materials and staff, repair and reconstruction of the facility to a safe and staffable level could be achieved within three (3) months or less.

In order to achieve this, a complement of 210 Daumann Engineers, Technicians, Staff and Specialists will be required, in addition to heavy construction equipment. Furthermore, shipment and provision of substantial quantities of replacement parts will be required. The Senior Inspection Agent of "Client File: Altona Station (RS)" compiled as a minimum requirement the provision to Altona of:

• 1000 Optical Chips
  
• 500 Optronic Arrays
  
• 2500 Optronics
  
• 2500 Plasfoam Conduits
  
• 2500 Hull Segments
  
• 5000 Industrial Hardware
  
• 5000 Industrial Materials
  
• 5000 Fusion Diodes
  
• 500 Robotic Hardware
  
• 10000 Reinforced Alloy
  
• 500 Hazmat Cannisters

- No additional Notes -
Looks like you got off pretty easy in the end Niklas. If your people can ship it, mine will fix it. We'll get that old tub up and running again before you know it. Mein wort! -Erwin.